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Introduction
Human language comprises figurative and non-figurative
dimensions. For instance, the use of the verb ‘‘fell’’ in the sentence
‘‘The coin fell into the sewer’’ is different from its use in the
sentence ‘‘He fell in love’’. In the first sentence, and according to
the Oxford English Dictionary, the verb is used in its first sense of
‘‘move downward’’. In the second sentence it is used in its
extended metaphorical sense: ‘‘pass into a specified state’’.
Differentiating figurative and non-figurative language-use may
be highly important for a variety of applications that are based on
natural language understanding. For example, giving a robot the
order: ‘‘Give me the bottle’’ is totally different from giving the
order: ‘‘Give me a break’’. To obey the order, the robot must have
a natural language understanding module that can differentiate
between figurative and non-figurative language.
In this context, the justification for the current work may be
stretched along several levels. At the minimal level, developing
algorithms for metaphor identification is justified in order to
improve the performance of different applications drawing on
natural language understanding. For these applications it is
necessary to differentiate figurative and non-figurative language
as illustrated above.
From a wider theoretical perspective, we draw on the thesis that
human behavior and reasoning is somehow mediated by
metaphors and that metaphors people use may reflect their
worldviews. In this context, algorithms for metaphor identification
may be a first step for better understanding metaphors and the
worldviews that they represent. Here we adhere to the minimal
level only by keeping the general theoretical context in mind.
However, we first start with the more general theoretical level
framing and guiding our work.
The ability to differentiate figurative from non-figurative
language is an important milestone in Natural Language Un-
derstanding because higher levels of human thinking may involve
the use of metaphors, and metaphors may somehow reflect the
way people think. This thesis emerged in Cognitive Linguistics,
where the classical concept of metaphor as a rhetorical ornament
has been replaced by the idea that metaphor is a psycholinguistic
device for understanding one conceptual domain in terms of
another conceptual domain (e.g., My lawyer is a shark) [1,2]. In
the sentence ‘‘My lawyer is a shark’’, the Conceptual Metaphor
involves the use of the ANIMAL category to describe the
PERSON category. We are aware of the fact that Conceptual
Metaphor Theory, as presented by George Lakoff has been
criticized on several dimensions [3,4]. Nevertheless, we adopt it as
a starting point although the algorithms presented in the paper are
independent on the theory’s validity.
In this paper, we aim to develop algorithms for metaphorical
phrase identification. Identifying conceptual metaphors is another
important challenge. However, this challenge is beyond the scope
of the current paper.
It is argued that human thinking is not only highly metaphorical
[2], but that metaphors mediate human behavior and reasoning
[5]. While the simple causal influence of metaphors on reasoning
and behavior may be questioned, the emerging empirical evidence
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of ‘‘language as context’’ for a variety of cognitive processes (e.g.,
[6,7]) provides some support to the thesis that in a given context
the use of different metaphors by the same subject may lead to
different cognitive and behavioral responses. While [5] argument
doesn’t go without critique, specifically in the context of the
debatable relation between language and thought (see [8]), the
language-thought debate is just one more justification for initiating
the current study.
Metaphors have turned into an important object of research in
fields ranging from psychology to natural language processing
[5,9–15]. In this context, a minimal condition for automated
understanding of metaphorical language is the ability to differen-
tiate between metaphorical and non-metaphorical language-use.
From the above example (My lawyer is a shark) we can see that
the general definition of a conceptual metaphor is theoretically
rather clear. However, in practice, the decision whether a given
linguistic expression/phrase is metaphorical is far from trivial, as
the boundary between the denotational basic meaning of a phrase
and its extended metaphorical sense is fuzzy [16]. For instance, it
is quite clear that a ‘‘sweet child’’ isn’t sweet in the same sense as
‘‘sweet chocolate’’. In the first case, ‘‘sweet’’ is not used in its
denotational ‘‘sugary’’ sense but in its extended metaphorical
sense: pleasant. However, is ‘‘wise government’’ a literal or
metaphorical language use? In this case, we will probably be less
confident in making a decision.
One possible approach for resolving this difficulty is to adopt
a commonsensical criterion for a metaphor and to consider the
common use of a phrase as literal use and its violation as indicative
of metaphorical use. However, the most frequent sense of a phrase
cannot always be used to indicate its literal sense. To illustrate this
point, we can examine the ten most frequent nouns co-located
with the adjective ‘‘great’’. We used the Corpus of Contemporary
American English (COCA) [17], and following the norm of
COCA used Mutual Information (MI) equal to or greater than 3
as a minimum criterion for significant statistical association
between the words. Mutual Information (MI) is a quantity that
measures the mutual dependence of two random variables. In our
case, the mutual information of two words is a measure that
indicates the degree to which two words are statistically associated.
In the Corpus of Contemporary American English, Mutual
Information of words A and B is calculated as follows:
MI w1,w2ð Þ~log10
AB  sizeCorpusð Þ




A= frequency of node word w1 (e.g., purple): 1262
B= frequency of collocate w2 (e.g., color): 115
AB= frequency of collocate near the node word (e.g., color near
purple): 24
sizeCorpus = size of corpus (for instance 96,263,399)
span= span of words (e.g., 3 to left and 3 to right of the node
word: 6)
log10 (2) = 0.30103
MI (purple, color) = 11.37= log10 ((24*96,263,399)/
(1262*115*6) )/.30103
By following the above procedure, we identified the top ten
nouns located one lexical unit to the right of ‘‘great’’. In all of these
cases ‘‘great’’ was used in the sense of ‘‘important’’ (e.g., great deal,
great job, great depression). However, the more basic ‘‘embodied’’
and literal sense of ‘‘great’’ is ‘‘very big, large scale’’!
These results support the argument that using the common
sense of the phrase as an indication of literal use is a wrong move.
In fact, this is the main problem hindering the use of the
‘‘selectional preference’’ approach [18,19] to metaphor identifica-
tion, which considers violations of normative use as an indication
of metaphorical language. Let us explain the meaning of
‘‘selectional preference’’ and its relevance for metaphor identifi-
cation. ‘‘Selectional preference’’ describes the statistical ‘‘tenden-
cy’’ of words to co-occur with ‘‘selected’ or ‘‘preferred’’ words
from certain semantic categories. This idea is presented by Light
and Greiff [20] as follows: ‘‘Words in the same sentence stand in
relationships with one another. For example, in the person quickly ate
the delicious sandwich, the verbal predicate eat has person and sandwich
as arguments. Similarly, quickly and delicious have as arguments eat
and sandwich, respectively. These predicates have preferences for
the semantic class membership of the arguments filling a particular
role. For example, eat prefers, as its object argument, words from
the semantic class of food and disprefers words from the semantic
class of fluids.’’ (p. 269) We can simply explain ‘‘selectional
preference’’ as the constraints or limitations of certain argument-
predicate relations. This idea is further elaborated by Hoey [21]
who suggests that all lexical items are primed by grammatical and
selectional co-locational use. In the context of metaphor, we may
argue that metaphorical language-use ‘‘violates’’ the constraints
imposed by literal or figurative language use. For instance, if we
know that the verb ‘‘Drink’’ selects nouns belonging to the
semantic category of FOOD, then when we are asked to judge the
sentence: ‘‘My car drinks gasoline’’, we judge it to be metaphorical
as the noun ‘‘gasoline’’, which does not belong to the category of
FOOD, violates the selectional preference of ‘‘Drink’’.
Following Lakoff and Johnson [2], the criterion we chose in
order to determine whether a phrase is metaphorical, is how close
the word’s sense is to its embodied origins. Embodied origin is the
way the concept is grounded in sensorimotor experience [2]. This
is why ‘‘Big house’’ is a literal phrase and a ‘‘Big issue’’ is
a metaphorical phrase. In its literal sense, ‘‘Big’’ points to
a spatially large object but its metaphorical extended sense is
‘‘important’’. A literal phrase can be traced to its embodied source
while a metaphorical phrase is its extension. This is precisely the
criterion we provide the annotators in this work for determining
whether a phrase is literal or metaphorical.
A conceptual metaphor can be expressed in a variety of
linguistic patterns. Following Krishnakumaran and Zhu’s [12]
approach, we focus our work on three types of metaphorical
phrases involving nouns. Those authors differentiate between type
I, II, and III metaphors.
In a type I metaphor, a subject noun is associated with an object
noun via a form of the copula verb ‘‘to be’’, such as in the case of
‘‘God is a king’’. For a type II metaphor, the verb is the focus of
the metaphorical use representing the act of a subject noun on an
object noun, such as in the case of ‘‘The war absorbed his energy’’.
Type III metaphors involve an adjective-noun phrase such as
‘‘sweet girl’’.
It is clear that Krishnakumaran and Zhu’s typology of noun-
based metaphors does not fully exhaust the wide spectrum and
richness of metaphorical language. Therefore, we have no
pretension that we will cover all forms of metaphors. Nevertheless,
the typology offered by Krishnakumaran and Zhu identifies some
of the most basic and important linguistic metaphorical structures,
and therefore it is a heuristic that guides the development of
algorithms for metaphor identification. Future studies will extend
our results to other expressions and forms of metaphors. Here we
present three algorithms for identifying the above types of
metaphors in unstructured texts and evaluate the algorithms on
two large corpora. As will be seen, these algorithms have
outperformed the state-of-the-art algorithm for metaphor identi-
fication.
Metaphor Identification
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Approaches to Metaphor Identification
Different approaches exist for the identification of metaphors
ranging from Word Sense Disambiguation to the use of words’
categorization [9,12] and clustering [22]. Let us explain some of
these approaches starting with Word Sense Disambiguation
(WSD). Many words in natural language have more than one
sense. For instance, the word ‘‘Bread’’ may be used in the sense of
FOOD or in its slang use as a synonym with MONEY. The
ambiguity associated with word senses presents Natural Language
Processing with many difficulties and Word Sense Disambiguation
(e.g., [23]) is the field of research in which algorithms are
developed to disambiguate the sense of a word in context. One
approach to metaphor identification considers this task as
analogous to word sense disambiguation and tries to ‘‘disambig-
uate’’ the sense of a given phrase in order to decide whether it is
used in a literal or metaphorical sense. Along similar lines, we may
use Word Categorization. Word categorization involves the
classification of words into semantic sets. The use of word
categorization is evident in the selectional preference approach we
have described above. To classify noun semantics, in the current
study we used the WordStat noun categorization based on
WordNet, which classifies 69,817 nouns into 25 different
categories, such as Artifact (e.g., Chair) or Food (e.g., Bread).
As there is no gold-standard for comparing metaphor
identifications, it is rather difficult to evaluate the performance
of different metaphor identification algorithms. However, to
provide the reader with a wide perspective on the field we review
some notable attempts relevant to automatic metaphor identifica-
tion.
Hashimoto and Kawahara [24] discuss work on a similar
problem, distinguishing idiomatic usage from literal usage. They
also approach this as a classical word sense disambiguation task.
Idioms are somewhat different from metaphors, in that the
meaning of an idiom (e.g., kick the bucket) is often difficult to derive
from the meanings of the component words, unlike most
metaphors.
Nissim and Markert [25] use supervised learning to distinguish
metonymic usage from literal usage. They take a classical WSD
approach, learning a separate model for each target word. As with
Birke and Sarkar [9,26] and Hashimoto and Kawahara [24], the
core idea is to learn to classify word usage from similarity of
context.
Martin [27] presents a knowledge-based approach to interpret-
ing metaphors. This approach requires complex hand-crafted
rules, which are specific to a given domain (e.g., interpreting
metaphorical questions from computer users, such as ‘‘How can I
kill a process?’’ in an online help system). The knowledge base
cannot handle words that are not hand-coded in its rules and a new
set of rules must be constructed for each new application domain.
Dolan [28] describes an algorithm for extracting metaphors
from a dictionary. Some suggestive examples are given, but the
algorithm is not evaluated in any systematic way.
Mason [29] takes a corpus-based approach to metaphor. His
algorithm is based on a statistical approach to discovering the
selectional restrictions of verbs. It then uses these restrictions to
discover metaphorical mappings, such as ‘‘Money flows like
a liquid’’. Although the system can discover some metaphorical
mappings, it was not designed to distinguish literal and
metaphorical usages of words.
Birke and Sarkar [9,26] address the problem of metaphor
identification as a classical word sense disambiguation task [30]. A
model is learned for each verb independent of the other verbs. The
problem with this approach is that it is limited and cannot handle
a new verb without additional training.
Turney et al. [15] present the state-of-the-art algorithm for
metaphor identification by comparing their results to those of
Birke and Sarkar The rationale of their Concrete-Abstract
algorithm is as follows. Type III metaphors, comprised of
adjective-noun phrases as in ‘‘dark thoughts’’, generally involve
the use of a concrete concept (‘‘dark’’) to describe a more abstract
concept (‘‘thought’’). Therefore, for the task of distinguishing
between metaphorical and literal phrases, they used only one
element: the abstractness rating of the noun in the phrase.
The basis of Turney et al.’s argument [15] was the hypothesis
that if the noun in an adjective-noun phrase is relatively abstract,
then the adjective is likely used in a concrete-embodied sense to
explain the meaning of the noun, and therefore the phrase
functions as a metaphor. For identifying type III and type II
metaphors, they used a very simple measure–the abstractness level
of the words. Drawing on a novel algorithm that rated the
abstractness level of words, they measured the abstractness level of
the noun in the case of type III metaphors and the average
abstractness level of the nouns in the sentence in the case of type II
metaphors. In other words, their algorithm is very simple. Given
an adjective noun phrase such as ‘‘Sweet dreams’’, the algorithm
and the model take into account only one thing, which is the
abstractness score of the noun in the phrase. Based on this
abstractness score and the coefficient calculated in a Binary
Logistic Regression model, a binary choice is made whether the
phrase is metaphorical or not.
Tested on a list of 100 adjective-noun phrases, this algorithm
resulted in an average of 79% accuracy [15]. Despite its impressive
performance in terms of accuracy, it was recently shown by Assaf
et al. [31] that at least with regard to type III metaphors, the
Concrete-Abstract algorithm developed by Turney et al. has
a blind spot, and its impressive performance is limited to cases
where the adjective has a clear embodied base. This paper
presents a preliminary examination of the Concrete Category
Overlap (abbreviated as CCO) algorithm to be detailed below.
The CCO was tested on a test set that is an extension of Turney
et al.’s [15] test phrases and on a second test set that included
adjective-noun pairs with nouns that have a lower abstractness
level, such as in the word pair ‘‘Broken heart’’. Assaf et al.’s [31]
argument was that the Concrete-Abstract algorithm has a serious
blind spot in dealing with such phrases. For instance, in the phrase
‘‘Broken heart’’ the noun ‘‘heart’’ is a relatively concrete object.
Therefore, the Concrete-Abstract algorithm might judge the
phrase as literal language-use. Indeed, it was shown that the
Concrete-Abstract algorithm totally fails in dealing with such
phrases, while the CCO algorithm performed well. It was
therefore a preliminary test of the algorithm and a calibration of
the algorithm’s parameters. In contrast, the current paper
evaluates the CCO algorithm and its derivatives (CCO* and
CCO**) on (1) complete sentences rather than on isolated phrases,
(2) two large corpora, and (3) with regard to five target words.
The Contribution of the Current Work
The contribution of the current paper in comparison to other
works in the field can be briefly described along several
dimensions.
(1) In contrast to recent algorithms that are based on supervised
learning, [22] our algorithms are rule-based and do not
require a training corpus of metaphorical and non-metaphor-
ical phrases.
(2) While Shutova, Teufel, and Korhonen [22] have realized the
importance of abstractness in metaphor identification, they
have not developed or used any tool that measures the
Metaphor Identification
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abstractness level of phrases. Our metaphor identification
algorithms use such a tool developed by Turney et al. [15]. It
must be emphasized, that in our algorithms the use of the
abstractness measure is used as an indirect approximation of
the noun’s embodied nature. This idea draws on [32] that
have used this approach, with all the inevitable qualifications,
for successfully measuring semantic relatedness.
(3) Our algorithms integrate two approaches: selectional prefer-
ence and abstractness-based metaphor identification, [15]
a combination that has been shown [31] to solve the well-
documented problems associated with the selectional prefer-
ence approach and to outperform the state-of-the-art
algorithm developed by Turney et al. [15].
(4) In contrast with other works, our algorithms are lexicon and
domain independent. Goatly [33], for instance, relies on a set
of linguistic cues such as ‘‘metaphorically speaking’’, whereas
Mason [29] utilizes domain-specific selectional preferences.
Our algorithms are not constrained by limited knowledge
domains such as FINANCE or SPORT.
(5) The algorithms are fully automatic and do not rely on hand
crafted knowledge (e.g., [33]).
(6) Our algorithms identify three major types of metaphorical
phrases and are not limited to one type only, such as verb-
based metaphors studied by [22].
(7) Our algorithms were evaluated on two large corpora; for their
evaluation we annotated a large number of phrases using
several independent human annotators. For instance, in
a recent paper by Shutova, Teufel, and Korhonen [22], the
annotators received ‘‘78 randomly sampled sentences’’ (p. 41).
In comparison, in the current study and for the Reuters
corpus only, four annotators annotated 1378 phrases.
We evaluated the algorithms on five target nouns: Governance,
Government, God, Father, and Mother. The motivation for
choosing these nouns was the interest in studying the metaphorical
representation of government/governance. As government/gov-
ernance may be metaphorically represented as extensions of
parental images, what is called in the literature the symbolic
father/mother, we included the target terms father, mother, and
God–the ultimate symbolic father. The justification of using such
a small number of words and the inevitable implications resulting
from this choice are presented in the concluding section.
We present our algorithms for automated metaphor identifica-
tion. As our algorithms emerged from the algorithm for the
identification of type III (adjective-noun) metaphors, [31] we
present it first.
Identifying Type III Metaphors
As previously mentioned, the algorithm we have developed for
identifying type III metaphors is titled the ‘‘Concrete Category
Overlap’’ algorithm (CCO) [31]. Our starting point is Turney’s
Concrete-Abstract algorithm. The CCO assumes, as do Turney
et al. [15], that a metaphor usually involves mapping from
a relatively concrete domain to a relatively abstract domain.
However, it takes into account the importance of considering what
those specific conceptual domains are. Literal use of a concrete
adjective will tend to be more salient with regard to certain
semantic categories of concrete objects and not others. For
instance, in its literal use, the word ‘‘dark’’ may be associated with
certain noun categories such as Physical Object (e.g., ‘‘table’’) or
Body Part (e.g., ‘‘skin’’). This notion leads directly to the CCO, which
assumes that if the noun modified by an adjective or head noun belongs to one of
the concrete categories associated with the literal use of the adjective, then it is
probably literal and otherwise it is probably metaphorical. In a sense, this
algorithm combines the notion of measuring abstractness/
concreteness and that of using selectional preferences, as has been
well-explored in previous work on metaphor identification [18]. In
other words, we adopt the idea that the selectional preference of
the adjective for certain nouns may be indicative of metaphorical
use, but first check the selectional preference of the adjective to
concrete nouns only in order to establish its denotative literal
sense. Therefore, while the Concrete-Abstract algorithm uses only
the noun’s level of abstractness in order to determine whether the
phrase is metaphorical, the CCO is much more complicated as it
first identifies the most concrete nouns modified (i.e., selectively
preferred) by the adjective and only then decides whether the
target adjective-noun phrase violates this selectional preference.
This hybrid approach overcomes the well-known issues of the pure
selectional preferences approach, [34] in particular its tendency to
over-generate metaphor hypotheses and be misled by common
conventionalized metaphors. We first present a general overview
of CCO, then its pseudo-code, and finally elaborate the
algorithm’s fine details.
The CCO retrieves candidate adjective-noun phrases (A, N)
with the target noun. It discards phrases identified in Wiktionary
as idioms, or those where the adjective and/or noun have no
dictionary definitions. Given the adjective-noun pair (e.g., strong
government) the algorithm then works along the following lines. If
the adjective A has a single dictionary definition then the phrase is
labeled as LITERAL, since metaphorical usage cannot exist for
one sense only. Else, the algorithm verifies that the noun N belongs
to at least one WordNet category. If this is not the case, the
algorithm cannot make a decision and stops. Otherwise, it
identifies through a tagged n-grams corpus (COCA’s n-grams)
up to hnum nouns most frequently collocated with the adjective A,
sorts them according to Turney’s abstractness scale [15] and
chooses the k most concrete nouns. These nouns are categorized
using WordNet, and significant concrete categories having at least
hcat nouns each are selected. If the noun N does not belong to the
Table 1. The Reuters Corpus – Number of Annotated
Expressions.
Expression Type
Target word I II III
Father 17 116 62
God 5 19 13
Governance 0 5 13
Government 86 277 613
Mother 12 81 59
Total 120 498 760
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062343.t001
Table 2. Annotators’ Decision – Reuters.
Expression Type
Annotators’ decision I II III
Literal 40 (33.3%) 242 (48.6%) 576 (75.8%)
Metaphorical 80 (66.7%) 256 (51.4%) 184 (24.2%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062343.t002
Metaphor Identification
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any concrete WordNet category, return METAPHORICAL else
return LITERAL. The pseudocode of CCO is presented below.
Input: An adjective-noun pair ,A,N..
1. If the adjective A has a single dictionary definition then return
LITERAL, else
2. If the noun N does not belong to any WordNet category, then
return UNDECIDED, else
3. Let N(A) be the hnum nouns most frequently collocated with A,
with mutual information of at least hMI.
4. Let NC be the k most concrete nouns in N(A).
5. Let Cat(A) be the set of all semantic noun categories containing
at least hcat nouns in N
C.
6. If N belongs to one of the categories in Cat(A), then return
LITERAL, else return METAPHORICAL.
The basic idea is that an adjective is assigned to a set of semantic
categories based on the most frequent concrete nouns that it
modifies. We require these pairs to have minimum mutual
information as well, to ensure that the nouns are closely associated
with the adjective. Assaf et al. [31] identified these nouns by
simple collocation in the Corpus of Contemporary American
English (COCA), [17] setting the collocation lexical window to +1,
hnum to 1000, and hMI to 3. The 100 most concrete nouns were
identified based on the abstraction scale developed by Turney
et al., [15] which provides a degree measure from 0 to 1.0 with
lower values being more concrete and higher values being more
abstract.
To classify noun semantics, CCO uses the WordStat noun
categorization based on WordNet (http://www.provalisresearch.
com/wordstat/WordNet.html), which classifies 69,817 nouns into
25 categories, of which 13 are concrete categories (e.g., artifact). As
CCO selects the most concrete nouns, it is expected that the words
should be categorized only in these 13 categories. Based on
statistics calculated from the most frequent 10,000 nouns in
COCA, it was found that, on average, each noun is assigned to
two categories. Therefore, if we randomly assign 100 concrete
nouns to the 13 concrete categories we would expect, on average,
15.4 words in each category. CCO thus set Cat(A) to be all
categories containing at least hcat = 16 nouns from N
C. This helps
avoid choosing categories that do not really represent literal use of
the adjective A. The CCO algorithm has been evaluated on 682
phrases and outperformed the Concrete-Abstract algorithm [31].
Here we validate these findings by evaluating them on complete
sentences drawn from the test corpora.
Identifying Type II Metaphors
Verb-based metaphors are identified through a simple extension
of CCO and this extension is named CCO*. For identifying the
linguistic metaphor we used the three-word phrase TP=,N1, V,
N2., where N1 is the subject noun, N2 is the object noun, and V is
the verb linking them. Either N1 or N2 can be target nouns. For
example, ‘‘The Fed ate my savings’’, where the subject (‘‘Fed’’) is
a target noun.
For deciding whether the phrase indicates metaphorical use, we
first search Wiktionary for the definitions of the verb. If the verb
has one definition only, then TP is LITERAL, else we move to the
next phase and search the n-grams corpus for the 1000 most
frequent nouns collocated in a lexical window of +2 to the right of
the verb and having MI$3.
We rank the nouns on the abstractness scale and choose the 100
most concrete nouns. These nouns are categorized using the
WordNet categorization, and the significant concrete categories
are selected according to the same procedure applied in the CCO.
Following the above example (‘‘The Fed ate my savings’’), we
should identify the 100 most concrete nouns collocated with the
verb [eat]. The categorization of these nouns will show us that the
most dominant category is FOOD.
We also categorize the object noun (e.g., savings). If none of its
nouns overlap with the categories of the 100 nouns associated with
the verb, then we return METAPHORICAL. Else, we reduce the
number of noun categories using the ConceptNet (http://csc.
media.mit.edu/docs/conceptnet), which is a huge repository of
common sense knowledge constructed by MIT. For example,
searching the relevant category of savings we found that ‘‘Save is
a fund’’. If the most highly ranked category of the object noun is
not included in the categories of the 100 nouns associated with the
verb, then METAPHORICAL; else LITERAL.
The reason for this reduction procedure is illustrated through
the following example. Assume we analyze the metaphor ‘‘She ate
my heart’’. The most concrete nouns collocated with ‘‘eat’’ can be
categorized into two main categories: FOOD (e.g., ice cream) and
ARTIFACT (e.g., cake). Heart can be categorized as BODY as
well as ARTIFACT. Heart shares the ARTIFACT category with
the category characterizing the most concrete nouns that are the
objects of ‘‘eat’’. However, it doesn’t mean that the phrase is
literal. The pseudocode of CCO* is presented below.
Input: ,N1, V, N2. (the verb V represents the act of the
subject N1 on the object N2).
1. Identify the 100 most concrete object nouns associated with the
verb V in a corpus.
2. Categorize the 100 nouns by using WordNet.
3. Categorize the object noun N2.
4. If none of the object noun categories overlaps with one of the
categories of the 100 nouns associated with the verb, then
return METAPHORICAL.
5. Find the main category of the object noun using ConceptNet.
6. If the main category is not included in the categories of the 100
nouns, then return METAPHORICAL; else return LITERAL.
Table 3. Annotators’ Decision – NYT.
Expression Type
Annotators’ decision I II III
Literal 129 (47.6%) 189 (63%) 272 (63%)
Metaphorical 142 (52.4%) 111 (37%) 160 (37%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062343.t003
Table 4. Results – Reuters.
Expression
type A priori probability Precision 95% CI Recall
I 66.7% 83.9% 75–90% 97.5%
II 51.4% 76.1% 70–80% 82%
III 24.2% 54.4% 45–61% 43.5%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062343.t004
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Identifying Type I Metaphors
A simple approach for type I metaphor identification is to
compare the semantic categories of the nouns comprising the
metaphorical expression, a strategy that was used by Krishnaku-
maran and Zhu [12]. For instance, the phrase ‘‘My lawyer is
a shark’’ can be considered as metaphorical because the nouns
‘‘lawyer’’ and ‘‘shark’’ do not belong to the same category. A
lawyer is a PERSON while a shark is an ANIMAL. This simple
and intuitive approach suffers from a major problem underlying
metaphor identification. This problem is the polysemous nature of
words. If a noun is polysemous then it potentially belongs to
several semantic categories. For instance, ‘‘Chicken’’ is both an
ANIMAL and FOOD. Therefore, when trying to decide whether
two nouns belong to the same category we find that they usually
belong to several categories. Moreover, the fact that two nouns
belong to the same category does not necessarily lead to
metaphorical use. For instance, ‘‘My cat is a tiger’’ is a metaphor
that may indicate the courage of my cat, despite the fact that both
cat and tiger belong to the ANIMAL category. The algorithm we
have developed for identifying type I metaphors aims to address
this difficulty. As its final phase relies on similar logic to the CCO it
is titled CCO**. The algorithm works along the following lines.
Given a target phrase TP having the dependency representation
nsubj(NS,NT), where NS (subject) is the source domain and NT
(object) is the target domain, we first identify, through the
WordNet categorization described above, the categories associated
with the source and target nouns. If they do not overlap then the
phrase is METAPHORICAL. Else, we move to the next phase
that aims to disambiguate the noun’s categories.
The disambiguation is necessary as illustrated through the
following example. In the phrase ‘‘My lawyer is a shark’’, lawyer is
categorized as a PERSON and shark as both ANIMAL and
PERSON.
Again we use the ConceptNet and search it for the pattern ‘‘NS
is a CS’’ and ‘‘NT is a CT’’, where CS and CT are the categories
identified at the previous phase. The categories identified at this
phase are described as CS* and CT*. IF CS* > CT*=Ø THEN
TP= ’METAPHORICAL’ else we move to the next phase.
Again, we identify the most frequent category associated with
NS and/or NT according to ConceptNet ranking and search the n-
grams corpus for the 1000 nouns that (1) are collocated in plus/
minus 4 lexical units with NS and NT, and (2) Having MI$3. We
scale the nouns according to abstractness level and choose the 100
most concrete nouns. These nouns are separately categorized for
NS and NT according to the categories identified by the
ConceptNet in the previous phase.
We choose the most dominant category associated with NS and
NT. The resulting categories are CS** and CT**, respectively. If
none of the noun’s categories overlap, then it is METAPHOR-
ICAL else it is LITERAL.
Input ,N1, N2. (a subject noun N1 associated with an object
noun N2 via a copula verb).
1. Identify the categories of N1 and N2. If they do not overlap
then return METAPHORICAL.
2. Find the main category of N1 and N2 using ConceptNet.
3. If the two main categories are different then return META-
PHORICAL.
4. Identify the 100 most concrete nouns associated with N1 and
N2 separately.
5. Categorize the 100 nouns associated with N1 and N2
separately.
6. If none of the nouns’ categories overlap with each other, then
return METAPHORICAL; else return LITERAL.
Data Sets
A. The Reuters Corpus
Our first data set is the Reuters RCV1 dataset, [35] in which we
search for texts including the five target words. The corpus size is
around 3.9 M sentences. The final corpus we processed included
342,000 texts. In each text we identified the first sentence that
included one of the target words. Our analysis focuses on unique
sentences for the target words God (N= 536), Governance
(N= 214), Father (N= 1923), Mother (N=2253), and Govern-
ment (N= 12800). Dead metaphors, or idioms, were removed
from the analysis based on Wiktionary.
Each sentence was parsed using Stanford Dependency Parser
[36]. Stanford POS Tagger [37] was used to identify word
categories. Candidates for metaphor identification have been
identified by searching for type I, II, and III phrases in the parsed
sentence. Table 1 presents the distribution of target word instances
across phrase (expression) types.
B. The New York Times Corpus
The second corpus we used was the New York Times archive
(1984), which contains around 70 M sentences. We searched the
archive for documents containing each of the target words and
extracted unique sentences (Governance = 5992, Govern-
ment = 22,793, Father = 16,489, Mother = 15,786,
God= 36,844). The metaphor annotation procedure was applied
only to a subset of the target word occurrences due to the timing
constraints of our experiment as detailed below.
Table 5. Comparative Results – Reuters.
Expression type Precision CCO Precision Con-Abs Recall CCO Recall Con-Abs
I 83.9% 76.53% 97.5% 76.53%
II 76.1% 63.87 82% 67.2%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062343.t005
Table 6. Results – NYT.
Expression
type A priori probability Precision 95% CI Recall
I 52.4% 84.1% 77–89% 85.9%
II 37% 62% 54–69% 83.8%
III 37% 69.8% 63–75% 88.1%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062343.t006
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Evaluation
After a candidate phrase has been automatically identified by
the NLP tools, the corresponding algorithm was run and the
output was a binary decision whether a phrase is metaphorical or
not. We ran our algorithms on CPU: i7-3820 CPU@ 3.60 GHz,
Memory: 16 GB DDR3 1333 Mhz, Windows 7 Pro 64-bit with
MS-SQL 2008 R2 Enterprise. Average running times for type I,
II, and III metaphor identification were 0.3, 10.2, and 0.4 seconds,
respectively.
To evaluate the algorithms’ performance, we compared their
decision to human judgment. Four subjects, three of them native
speakers of English and the fourth a medical student who has high
proficiency in English, annotated the phrases to determine
whether the phrase is used in its most salient embodied/concrete
sense or in a secondary, extended metaphorical sense. For
instance, in the case of ‘‘bitter lemon’’ the first embodied
definition of the adjective ‘‘bitter’’ is ‘‘Having an acrid taste
(usually from a basic substance)’’. When asked to judge, as
a training example, whether the phrase ‘‘bitter relations’’ is literal
or metaphorical, the judges used the basic denotation of ‘‘bitter’’ to
make a decision; as ‘‘relations’’ cannot have an acrid taste, the
phrase is judged as metaphorical. Based on Turney et al. [15], the
annotators received specific and detailed instructions for each
metaphor type.
They were given the entire sentence in which the linguistic
metaphor appears and in which the target word and its related
lexical units were visually marked. Inter-annotator agreement,
measured in terms of Cronbach’s alpha, was 0.78, 0.80, and 0.82
for type I, II, and III, respectively. The majority decision (i.e., 0 for
literal and 1 for metaphorical) was used as a criterion to determine
whether the use of the phrase is metaphorical.
When analyzing the decision accepted by the majority of
annotators (at least 3 out of 4 agreed) for type I metaphors, we
found that 76.6% of time they agreed on the classification of the
phrase as literal and 19.3% of the time they agreed the phrase is
metaphorical. In the case of type II metaphors, 48.6% agreed on
literal categorization and 49.8% on metaphorical, and in the case
of type III metaphors, 75.8% agreed on the literal and 15.2% on
the metaphorical. These results indicate that despite the specific
and detailed instructions given to the annotators, the decision
whether a phrase is metaphorical is highly controversial. Intensive
efforts are needed to train annotators even for a minimal
agreement of whether real world phrases are metaphorical.
Table 2 presents the distribution of the phrases annotated as
metaphorical/literal for the three metaphor types in the Reuters
corpus.
Table 3 presents the distribution of the phrases annotated as
metaphorical/literal for the three metaphor types in the NYT
corpus. In this case, inter-annotator agreement was 0.80, 0.76, and
0.72, respectively.
Results
Results for the Reuters corpus are presented in Table 4. Due to
the low prevalence of certain target words, we collapsed the results
and present them across target words. The results were organized
in a 2 by 2 matrix where the algorithm’s prediction (metaphor vs. -
metaphor) is compared to the annotators’ decision (metaphor vs. -
metaphor). The a priori measure is the proportion of metaphorical
phrases in the corpus. In this context, the meaning of Precision is
the proportion of correct positive results divided by the number of
all returned positive results. In other words, it is the number of true
metaphors; that is, phrases identified by the annotators as
metaphorical, out of the total number of phrases identified as
metaphorical by the algorithm. The Recall is the proportion of
phrases identified by the algorithm as metaphorical out of the total
number of true metaphors. The average precision is 71%, and the
improvement in prediction over the a priori probability for types I,
II, and III is 17.2%, 24.7%, and 30.2%, respectively. The average
improvement is 24%. This means that a random guess whether
a phrase is metaphorical would have been based on the
metaphors’ prevalence in the corpus. However, the probability
of identifying a metaphor given the algorithm’s decision that
a metaphor has been identified would have improved the precision
by 24%. The recall results show that we could successfully retrieve
between 43% and 97% of actual metaphors.
We compared the performance of CCO’s algorithms to the
state-of-the-art results gained by Concrete-Abstract (here abbre-
viated as Con-Abs) algorithm of Turney et al. [15]. For type I
metaphors we used the abstractness levels of N1 and N2. For type
II metaphors we measured the averaged abstractness level of the
nouns in the sentence. Regarding type III metaphors, Con-Abs
failed to produce any results. Results for types I and II are
presented in Table 5 where CCO is used as a generic term for
CCO* and CCO**.
We can see that our algorithms outperformed the results of
Concrete-Abstract. Combining CCO’s decision and Con-Abs’ in
a Binary Logistic Regression Analysis has not improved the
precision but only the recall to 95%.
Table 6 presents the results for the NYT corpus.
The average precision is 72%, which is quite similar to the
average precision found in the Reuters corpus. The improvement
in prediction over the a priori probability for types I, II, and III is
31.7%, 25%, and 32.8%, respectively. The average improvement is
29.8%. More than 80% of all metaphorical phrases of types I–III
could be successfully retrieved by our method.
Again comparing the performance of our algorithms to Con-
Abs, we found that Con-Abs failed to produce any results for type
III metaphors. Results for types I and II are presented in Table 7.
We can see that our algorithms outperformed Con-Abs. In this
case, combining the prediction of CCO algorithms and Con-Abs
has not resulted in any significant change in precision or recall.
Table 7. Comparative Results – NYT.
Metaphor type Precision CCO Precision Con-Abs Recall CCO Recall Con-Abs
I 84.1% 65.6% 85.9% 72.5%
II 62% 50% 83.8% 5%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0062343.t007
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Conclusions
The exponential increase in the amount of textual information
has not been proportionally accompanied by computational tools
that may turn this ‘‘semantic sphere’’ [38] into meaningful and
usable patterns. As argued by Gruber, [39] we have not yet
learned how to turn ‘‘collected intelligence’’ into ‘‘collective
intelligence’’. To address this challenge, one must develop
sophisticated NLP algorithms inspired by human intelligence.
To the best of our knowledge, the current paper presents the
most comprehensive study of metaphor identification in terms of
scope of metaphorical phrases and annotated corpora size. The
rule-based algorithms have shown a significant predictive value
that is resilient across two different corpora. However, being
limited to five target words, the results should be cautiously used,
as variability of identification is evident across words and corpora.
This point should be further explained. Originally, we started our
analysis with a larger list of target words. However, searching the
corpora we immediately noticed the extremely low prevalence of
metaphors in a corpus. Metaphorically speaking, searching for
metaphors was like searching for a needle in a haystack. This low
prevalence deductively implies searching and processing bigger
portions of the haystack/corpus in order to find a minimal number
of metaphors for annotation. In the tradeoff between adding more
target words and getting a very limited number of cases for
analysis, or limiting our search to five target words, we have
chosen the second option, which increases the statistical power of
our analysis. The aim of the paper was to provide algorithms for
metaphor identification and in this context ‘‘internal validity’’ was
more important than ‘‘external validity’’ seeking to extend the
algorithms’ performance beyond the specific sample. Our decision
was also based on the realization that the population of words is so
big that even multiplying our sample by a factor of three would not
have resulted in a representative sample of words in natural
language. We must stress the fact that our work involves the most
comprehensive annotated corpora in the field but that we
modestly acknowledge the limits of a single study, extensive as it
may be, and the need for further studies with more words
involved.
The algorithms’ reliance on the concreteness-abstractness of
a target word may be improved through knowledge gained in
neuroscience concerning the embodied base of words [40,41]. The
translation of this emerging knowledge into metaphor identifica-
tion algorithms is far from trivial but seems to be a promising
direction specifically when combined with empirically grounded
norms of the neural basis of metaphors. [42].
Several difficulties are identified through the analysis. First, the
metaphor identification is dependent on the identification of
candidate expressions by the dependency parser, which is not
error free. In this sense, the performance of a given parser sets an
upper limit on the algorithm’s performance. For example, evaluating
structured phrases (e.g., adjective-noun pairs) rather than free-text
sentences, the CCO produced 80% precision, [31] in contrast with
an average of 62% precision found in the current study. Future
studies should therefore rely on better tools for parsing.
Another difficulty evident in metaphor identification research is
an objective criterion for metaphor identification. The relatively
low inter-annotator agreement in some cases is an indication that
there must be a better procedure for deciding whether an
expression is metaphorical or literal and that annotators should be
intensively trained in advance to reach consensual decisions,
possibly by using a reliable dictionary that differentiates between
the embodied sense of a word and its extended metaphorical sense.
The metaphor identification algorithms proposed in this paper
are generic, and they can be extended to other languages provided
sufficiently accurate linguistic resources and tools. We are
currently evaluating them on three additional languages with
initial results indicating the applicability of the algorithms to those
languages.
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